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Molina v. State, 120 Nev. Adv. Rep. 21, 87 P.3d 533 (Nev. 2004)1
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Summary
This case involves an appeal of a conviction entered on guilty pleas negotiated
with the state. The defendant, Molina, alleged that he plead guilty because his lawyer’s
inadequate assistance did not allow him to make an informed decision to plead guilty. He
also contended that his attorney violated the attorney-client privilege by divulging
communications between him and his attorney.
Disposition/Outcome
Affirmed. The Nevada Supreme Court ruled that Molina had failed to show
ineffective assistance from counsel because he did not demonstrate that but for his
counsel’s mistakes, he would not have pled guilty. Molina also failed to show a violation
of the attorney-client privilege because the attorney divulged privileged communications
to defend himself against the accusation of inadequate assistance.
Factual and Procedural History
Molina was charged with three counts of sexual assault with a minor fourteen
years of age, two counts of lewdness with a child under fourteen years of age, and one
count of annoying a minor. Molina was initially represented by the public defender.
Subsequently, Molina fired the public defender and hired private counsel. Molina’s
private counsel was under the impression that he was hired to negotiate a better plea
agreement than what the public defender had previously done. After reviewing the
evidence against Molina and having discussions with the public defender that initially
handled the case, Molina’s counsel advised him that the present plea agreement was
probably the best he could do. Molina then decided to accept the offer and plead guilty to
one count of sexual assault and one count of lewdness with a minor. The trial court
canvassed Molina at which time he admitted to the allegations set forth in the plea. The
trial court concluded that he freely and voluntarily pled guilty the allegations.
Molina then moved to withdraw his guilty plea before he was sentenced. Molina
claimed that he did not enter into the plea agreement knowingly and willingly because of
ineffective assistance by his counsel. He argued that his counsel had met with him only
once, advised him that he had to accept the agreement, and did not explore all possible
options concerning his case with him. Molina’s counsel argued that he met with him
twice, had six telephonic conversations with him, discussed the evidence against him, and
discussed what the state would need to prove in the case. Counsel also informed Molina
that because he lacked a defense to the allegations, the State’s plea offer was the best he
could do. The trial court denied Molina’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and his
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
1

By Jeff Hall

Discussion
The court began its discussion by citing the two-part test for ineffective assistance
of counsel set fourth in Strickland v. Washington.2 Strickland states that a defendant
must show that counsel’s performance fell below the objective standard of
reasonableness and that the defense was prejudiced by such action.3 The court also noted
at the outset that there is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance falls within the
reasonable objective standard.4 The court will examine the totality of the circumstances
to determine whether a defendant entered his plea freely and voluntarily.5
The court found that Molina failed to prove his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel because he could not show that his counsel’s performance was deficient under
Strickland. Molina’s counsel testified that he discussed the plea agreement and the
evidence with him. Molina and his counsel clearly understood the evidence and the
ramifications of the decision to plead guilty. While Molina complained that his attorney
did not make trial preparations, the court held that counsel is not required to exhaust all
available public or private resources to render effective assistance. Molina was aware of
the evidence against him and he also understood what his plea entailed. Based on the
totality of the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Molina’s motion to withdraw his plea.
Molina also argued that the trial court erred by allowing his counsel to divulge
privileged communications. Molina’s counsel testified that Molina told him, in front of
Mrs. Molina, that he had committed the acts he was charged with. Molina argued that he
did not waive the privilege by filing his motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. The court
recognized that attorney-client communications are confidential unless waived, but states
that a waiver of the privilege occurs when the attorney must respond to claims concerning
representation of the client.6 Further, statute provides that a post-conviction petition that
claims ineffective assistance of counsel effectively waives the attorney-client privilege.7
While Molina’s petition was presentence, the court finds that the same rule should apply.
The discussions between the client and attorney are always relevant in determining
whether the attorney’s assistance met the objective reasonable standard. The court
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466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 988, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (Nev. 1996) (applying the Strickland test in
Nevada).
4
Dawson v. State, 108 Nev. 112, 115, 825 P.2d 593, 595 (Nev. 1992).
5
Crawford v. State, 117 Nev. 718, 722, 30 P.3d 1123, 1125-26 (Nev. 2001).
6
See NEV. REV. STAT. 49.055 (2004). This statutes states that “a communication is ‘confidential’ if it is
not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is in the furtherance of the
rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of
the communication.”; See also NEV. SUP. CT. R. 156(3)(b). This rule states that
“a lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary: to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil
claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to
respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the
client.”
7
See NEV. REV. STAT. 34.735 (2004).
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further stated that holding the opposite would allow a defendant to use insufficient
communication as a “sword” to claim ineffective assistance of counsel.8
Conclusion
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must satisfy the two-part test in
Strickland. Molina failed to show that his attorney’s performance was not that of a
reasonable attorney in the same position. An attorney is not required to use every
possible resource to meet this standard.
Additionally, the attorney-client privilege is waived when a defendant claims
ineffective assistance by counsel. The communications between the client and attorney
are crucial to the claim. Therefore, Molina waived the privilege when he made the claim
in his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
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